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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Supreme Court No. 
v. : Court of Appeals No. 900473-CA 
C. DEAN LARSEN, : Priority No. 14 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QVEgTIQN? PRESENTED 
1. Is scienter--the intent to defraud, deceive or 
manipulate—an element of the crime of securities fraud under 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21? 
2. Is expert testimony, concluding that an alleged 
misrepresentation or omission is "material," inadmissible in a 
prosecution for securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
1(2)? 
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The official decision of the Utah Court of Appeals 
issued on February 7, 1992. It was published at 180 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 13 (2/7/92). A copy is attached as Appendix A. 
JURISDICTION 
A. On February 7, 1991, the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision was filed. 
-1-
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B. No orders concerning a rehearing or extensions of 
time within which to petition for certiorari have been requested 
or made. 
C. Petitioner believes the respondent does not intend 
to file a cross-petition. 
D. The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2-2(5). 
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1: 
It is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not 
misleading; or 
(3) engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21: 
(1) A person who willfully violates any 
provision of this chapter except Section 61-
1-16, or who willfully violates any rule or 
order under this chapter, or who willfully 
violates Section 61-1-16 knowing the 
statement made to be false or misleading in 
any material respect, shall upon conviction 
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned 
not more than five years, or both. 
-2-
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(2) No person may be imprisoned for the 
violation of any rule or order if he proves 
that he had no knowledge of the rule or 
order. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27: 
This chapter may be so construed as to 
effectuate its general purpose to make 
uniform the law of those states which enact 
it and to coordinate the interpretation and 
administration of this chapter with the 
related federal regulation. 
17 C. F. R. § 240. 10b-5 ("Rule 10b-5" ): 
It shall be unlawful for any person, 
directly or indirectly, by the use of any 
means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility 
of any national securities exchange, 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not 
misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security. 
Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Testimony in the form of an opinion or inference 
otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it 
embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier 
of fact. 
-3-
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves a securities fraud prosecution. 
This petition raises a question of first impression in Utah: Is 
scienter--the intent to defraud, manipulate or deceive — an 
element of the crime of securities fraud under Utah Code Ann. §§ 
61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. Under federal law on which these 
provisions are patterned and with which Utah' s Act was intended 
to harmonize, it is. The Utah Court of Appeals says it is not. 
The government charged Mr. Larsen with securities fraud 
under these provisions, alleging that he misrepresented or 
omitted material facts in connection with the offer, sale or 
purchase of securities. (Ct. App. Opinion p. 4, Appendix A). 
Mr. Larsen requested the trial court to instruct the jury that an 
intent to defraud is an element of the charges and that his good 
faith is a defense. (Defendant' s Requested Jury Instructions 
Nos. 4-5, 30, attached as Appendix B). This was refused. 
(Appendix B). The jury was instead told that it is sufficient to 
convict a person for securities fraud in Utah simply if he or she 
acts "willfully": "When it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause a result. " (Instructions to 
the Jury, Nos. 14, 17 and 17A, Appendix C).1 
!The trial court granted a Certificate of Probable Cause on 
March 4, 1991. The court expressed concern that specific intent is 
an added element of securities fraud with which Mr. Larsen was 
charged. (Transcript of Proceedings, February 19, 1991, pp. 47-48, 
Appendix D). 
-4-
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This petition raises a second issue relating to the 
permissible scope of expert opinion regarding the materiality of 
alleged omissions in securities offering materials. At trial, 
the government was permitted, over objection, to present the 
"expert" testimony of Sherman Cook that certain facts allegedly 
not disclosed to investors were "material." 
On June 20, 1990, the jury convicted Mr. Larsen. On 
February 7, 1992, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial 
court, rejecting the view that intent to defraud is an element of 
a criminal violation of §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-27. (Ct. App. 
Opinion pp. 13-14, Appendix A). The Court of Appeals also found 
that the trial court did not err in admitting Mr. Cook' s 
testimony. (Ct. App. Opinion pp. 10-11, Appendix A). 
The Utah Supreme Court should grant certiorari to 
settle these important questions which greatly affect businesses 
and investors, and the course of state securities fraud 
prosecutions. Rule 46(d), Utah R. App. P. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Intent to Defraud is an Element of a Criminal 
Violation of Sections 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21 
The Court of Appeals decision that intent to defraud is 
not an element of a securities fraud violation under §§ 61-1-1(2) 
and 61-1-21, directly collides with the interpretation of the 
related federal provision on which Utah7 s Act was patterned and 
with which Utah' s law was intended to harmonize. A violation of 
-5-
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the related federal provision requires such intent ("scienter"). 
Utah' s law was intended to have the same interpretation, as we 
explain below. Discordantly, the Court of Appeals holding now 
permits strict-liability conviction (with possible imprisonment), 
as in this case, without proof that the accused was possessed of 
a mental state embracing intent to defraud, manipulate or 
deceive, and regardless of the accused' s good faith belief. (Ct. 
App. Opinion pp. 13-14). 
The language of § 61-1-1(2), construed, as it must be, 
according to the meaning intended by Utah' s legislature and 
Congress, and in harmony with United States Supreme Court 
decisions interpreting the related federal provisions on which 
§ 61-1-1 was patterned, plainly reveals that scienter is an 
element of the offense. 
1. Legislative Intent and Federal Judicial 
Construction 
In 1963, the Utah Legislature adopted (with certain 
revisions unimportant here) the Uniform Securities Act ("Uniform 
Act"). This is known as the Utah Uniform Securities Act ("Utah 
Act"). See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-28. Section 101 of the Uniform 
Act (§ 61-1-1 of Utah's Act) was patterned after Federal 
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") Rule X-10B-5 ("Rule 
10b-5"). See Uniform Securities Act § 101, Official Comment, 
reprinted in L. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 6 
(1976). The language of the three classes of proscribed activity 
-6-
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under § 61-1-1 and Federal Rule 10b-5 is identical. Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-1 and 17 C. F. R. § 240. 10b-5; pp. 2-3 supra. 
Consistently, under both § 61-1-1 and Rule 10b-5, criminal 
penalties are set for any "willful" violation.2 Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-1-21; 15 U. S. C. § 78ff. 
The Draftsmen' s Commentary to § 101 of the Uniform Act 
explains that Rule 10b-5 was "the logical model" for a uniform 
state fraud provision because of the language disparities in 
existing state statutes and " fre<?»v?3 of frhg gufrgt»riti»l frofly of 
judicial precedent which has been developed under the federal 
provisions." L. Loss, Commentary on the Uniform Securities Act 7 
(1976) (emphasis supplied). This comment reveals also that the 
Draftsmen anticipated that § 101, as adopted by the states, would 
be construed in harmony with federal court interpretation of Rule 
10b-5. 
Utah7 s legislature expressed synonymous intent. Aware 
of the Utah Act' s federal origin, Utah' s legislature declared 
that the Act was intended not only to encourage uniformity among 
the states, but "to coordinate the interpretation and 
administration of this chapter with the related federal 
regulation. " Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27 (emphasis supplied). The 
M^r. Larsen does not challenge the trial court' s instruction 
on "willfulness. " (Instruction No. 17, Appendix C). Willfulness 
is also an element of a § 61-1-1 violation. The trial court erred 
by refusing to instruct that scienter was a separate, additional 
element of the offence. See pp. 8-13 infra. 
-7-
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Utah Act must be construed to effectuate this "general purpose." 
14. 
2. Scienter is Required to Violate Rule 10b-5 
The federal regulation "related" to § 61-1-1 is Rule 
10b-5. See p. 7 supra. Rule 10b-5 was promulgated by the SEC 
under authority of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b) (the "1934 Act"),3 which proscribes 
"any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in 
contravention of SEC rules. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 
U.S. 184, 194, 96 S. Ct. 1375, 1382, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976). 
There is "no indication that any type of criminal or civil 
liability is to attach [under § 10(b)] in the absence of 
scienter"--the "intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud." 425 
U.S. at 193 n. 12, 205, 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n. 12, 1387 (emphasis 
supplied). See also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 713, 100 S. Ct. 
1945, 1964, 64 L. Ed. 2d 611 (1980) (Blackmun concurring and 
dissenting). Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) require the same mental 
state. Hochfelder. 425 U.S. at 212-14, 96 S. Ct. at 1390-91. 
See also Dirks v. SEC. 463 U. S. 646, 663, n. 23, 103 S. Ct. 3255, 
3266 n. 23, 77 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1983) (in criminal prosecution, 
3Section 10(b) was originally concerned solely with criminal 
prosecutions but later became the basis for a judicially-implied 
private cause of action. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug 
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730, 95 S. Ct. 1917, 1922, 44 L. Ed. 2d 539, 
546 (1975); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 184, 196, 96 S. 
Ct. 1375, 1382, 47 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1976). 
-8-
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" [sJcienter--' a mental state embracing intent to deceive, 
manipulate or defraud, ' [citation omitted]--is an independent 
element of a Rule 10b-5 violation"), citing Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
at 193-94 n. 12, 96 S. Ct. at 1381 n. 12 (scienter required in 
civil 10b-5 action). See also Aaron, 446 U.S. at 695, 100 S. Ct. 
at 1955. This is "the interpretation" of § 61-1-1's "related 
federal regulation" contemplated by the Utah legislature. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. 
Thus, while the language of Rule 10b-5 (b) & (c), like 
Utah's § 61-1-1(2) & (3), viewed in isolation, could be read to 
apply to any type of material misstatement or omission, 
intentional or not (the apparent basis of the Utah Court of 
Appeals' holding), "such a reading cannot be harmonized with the 
administrative history of the rule. " Hochfelder, 425 U. S. at 
212, 96 S. Ct. at 1390. "In the absence of a conflict between 
reasonably plain meaning and legislative history, the words of 
the statute must prevail." Aaron, 446 U. S. at 700, 100 S. Ct. at 
1957. The Utah legislature intended that § 61-1-1 would be 
s i mi1arly cons trued. 
3, gQQfl Ffrifrh j§ 3 Defengg 
Hand-in-hand with the scienter element is the 
consistent notion that good faith is a defense under Utah' s § 61-
1-1 and Rule 10b-5. Construing Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b) of the 
1934 Act, the Hochfelder Court explained that "[t]here is no 
-9-
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indication that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for 
[manipulative, deceptive or illicit] practices unless he acted 
other than in good faith." 425 U.S. at 206, 96 S. Ct. at 1387. 
The scienter requirement functions in part to protect good faith 
error. Dirks. 463 U.S. at 674-75 n. 11, 103 S. Ct. at 3271-72 
n. 11. See also State v. Puckett, 6 Kan. App. 2d 688, 634 P. 2d 
144, 152 (1981), af f' d 230 Kan. 296, 640 P. 2d 1198 (1982). 
The thorough, reasoned decisions of the United States 
Supreme Court are persuasive here as Utah' s legislature intended: 
Where a state statute is patterned after a federal 
statute, the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court and inferior federal courts, interpreting the 
parent federal statute, are, even though they were 
hjinflefl flown »ft$r tfre gtfloptiQn fry frhQ 9 W 9 Q$ t*iQ 
federal statute, most persuasive, particularly where 
such interpretations are the only ones extant with 
respect to the disputed words of the state statute. 
75 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 335 (1974) (emphasis supplied). See 
also Reeves v. Gentile. 813 P. 2d 111, 115 (Utah 1991) (" [t]he 
primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the 
intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was 
meant to achieve"); State v. Tavlor, 82 Ariz. 289, 312 P. 2d 162, 
165-66 (1957) (subsequent interpretation of federal statute was 
entitled to "great weight" in construing state statute); Geraahtv 
v. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle. 8 Wash. 2d 437, 112 P. 2d 
846, 849 (1941); Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-27. 
Other states have correctly applied these principles in 
construing their version of § 61-1-1. See Puckett. 634 P. 2d at 
-10-
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154, (citing Hochfelder and acknowledging scienter requirement); 
People v. Terranova, 38 Colo. App. 476, 563 P. 2d 363, 365-66 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977) (acknowledging scienter is an element, the 
court concluded: "we look to Federal court interpretation of 
Rule 10b-5 and the nature of the intent required to sustain a 
violation of the rule"). 
Several states, however, have failed to acknowledge (or 
were perhaps unaware of)4 the federal origin and meaning of the 
Uniform Securities Act and its intent to harmonize state and 
federal regulation. The government urges these decisions which 
would permit sweeping, strict-liability prosecutions. (State 
Brief p. 36, Appendix E). As we will show on appeal, these 
opinions are ill-advised and often inaccurate.5 Yet, like those 
courts, the Court of Appeals, focusing solely on the language of 
§ 61-1-21 and on Mr. Larsen' s use of the now-outmoded phrase 
"specific intent" in his description of the scienter element, 
overlooks the controlling rule; neither the Court of Appeals nor 
4See, e. a. . People v. Cook, 89 Mich. App. 72, 279 N. W. 2d 579 
(1979) (Hochfelder and its progeny not mentioned). 
5£§£, e. g. , State v. Temby, 108 Wis. 2d 521, 322 N. W. 2d 522, 
525-27 (1982); (State Brief p. 36). Inexplicably, the Tembv court 
cites Aaron for the proposition that intent to defraud is not an 
element under "the federal statute dealing with fraudulent 
securities transactions". 322 N. W. 2d at 526 (emphasis supplied). 
The Temby court, apparently unaware of the other federal statutes 
dealing with fraudulent securities transactions, ignores the Aaron 
Court' s holding that Rule 10b-5, the model for the provision at 
issue in Temby, and here, requires scienter. Aaron 446 U. S. at 
591, 100 S. Ct. at 1952-53. 
-11-
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the government, mention, yet alone analyze, Hochfelder and its 
reasoned progeny. (Ct. App. Opinion pp. 13-14, State Brief pp. 
34-36). The decision instead drives a wedge between the state's 
law and its federal model, sowing regulatory discord among states 
and new uncertainty among businesses and investors. See 
McWilliams, Thoughts on Borrowing Federal Securities Juris 
Prudence Under the Uniform Securities Act, 38 S. C. L. Rev. 243, 
245 (1987). In so doing, the Court of Appeals directly collides 
with Utah's legislative intent "to coordinate the interpretation" 
of the Utah Act with the "related federal regulation." Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-27. Here, the regulation "related" to § 61-1-1 is 
Federal Rule 10b-5 which includes the element of scienter. 
In view of the above, it is apparent that the Court of 
Appeals' holding -- that no greater mental state than "willful" 
is required in Utah to violate § 61-1-1 -- is incorrect. The 
state provisions must not be read in isolation, as the Court of 
Appeals implies, but in connection with legislative history and 
federal precedent, as Utah' s legislature intended. Compare 
Aaron, 446 U. S. at 700, 100 S. Ct. at 1957 (only in the absence 
of a conflict between reasonably plain meaning and legislative 
history will the words of the statute prevail). Like Rule lOb-5, 
Utah's § 61-1-1 must be construed in harmony with its legislative 
and administrative genesis, "a history making clear that when the 
Commission adopted the Rule, it was intended to apply only to 
-12-
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activities that involved scienter. " Hochfelder, 425 U. S. at 212, 
96 S. Ct. at 1390. 
The trial court' s refusal to instruct the jury 
concerning this element of the offenses charged under § 61-1-1, 
as Mr. Larsen requested, is reversible error as a matter of law. 
State v. Jones, 177 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 3-4 (S. C. 1/14/92). This 
failure, which constitutes a violation of due process (see 
Carella v. California. 491 U.S. 263, 265, 109 S. Ct. 2419, 2420 
(1989); State v. Scott. 110 Wash. 2d 682, 757 P. 2d 492, 496 
(1988) (en banc)), "can never be harmless error". 177 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 4. Certiorari should be granted. 
B. Expert Qpinipn Testimony Relying TQ The L^gal 
Standard of Materiality Under Utah Code Ann. 3 61-
1-1 ig Impyopey 
Another question of first impression raised here 
involves the permissible scope of opinion evidence by experts on 
issues of law and legal standards in the context of securities 
claims. 
The trial court permitted Sherwood Cook to testify, 
over objection6 whether in his expert opinion certain alleged 
omissions by Mr. Larsen (presented in oversimplified hypothetical 
5Prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Larsen also submitted a 
motion in limine to preclude the government from presenting opinion 
testimony from "securities experts" regarding whether certain 
representations or omissions met the legal standard of 
"materiality" for purposes of a securities fraud prosecution under 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2). The trial court did not rule. 
-13-
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form) would be "material." (Ct. App. Opinion ?. 8). Mr. Cook 
was presented to the jury as an attorney admitted to practice in 
both Utah and Nevada, a former securities regulation official for 
the state of Utah and the top Securities Administrator for 
Nevada — someone "familiar with both the state and federal 
requirements of disclosure in limited offerings. " (Transcript 
vol. VI, R-1612, p. 42 11. 9-15, Appendix D). Cook was permitted 
in essence to opine that certain facts Mr. Larsen omitted from 
securities registrations were "material." The effect was to 
permit Cook to render his expert opinion that Mr. Larsen was 
guilty. (Transcript pp. 45, 76-77, 85-86, 89, 90, 90-91, 93, 
Appendix D).7 Even the government candidly described this issue 
as "a close one." (State Brief p. 33). 
The Utah Court of Appeals, citing United States v. 
Leuben, 812 F. 2d 179 (5th Cir. 1987), ruled that Cook's testimony 
was permissible because it went to "an ultimate issue of fact." 
(Ct. App. Opinion p. 10). 8 
While the Appeals Court duly recited the standard for 
admissible opinion set forth in Davidson v. Prince, 813 P. 2d 
1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), it misapplied Leuben, misconstrued the 
Cook even testified, over objection, regarding another 
investigation he supervised of Mr. Larsen and others involving a 
transaction which took place prior to the events giving rise to 
this case. Transcript pp. 47-52, Appendix D). 
8One member of the panel of the Court of Appeals declined to 
join in this section of the opinion. (Ct. App. Opinion p. 15). 
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intent of Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence and disregarded 
judicial precedent analyzing the unique problems involved in 
defining the appropriate scope of expert testimony in securities 
fraud cases. This body of caselaw confirms what the transcript 
plainly reveals, the testimony of Sherwood Cook was improper and 
highly prejudicial. See United States v. Zipkin, 729 F. 2d 384 
(6th Cir. 1984). The Court should grant certiorari to determine 
whether a separate standard for expert opinion is appropriate in 
the context of securities claims, and to elucidate the 
appropriate standard to be applied to "experts" who testify as to 
the force and effect of law. 
1. D e c i s i o n s Analyz ing E x p e r t Opinion Testimony 
i n g e g y y j U e S Fy»yujL AgtJQQg CQirtrQl, Ngi; 
L$yl?en 
Several important decisions involving securities fraud 
address the issue raised here. These include Scop v. United 
States, 846 F. 2d 135 (2d Cir. 1988) and Matthews v. Ashland 
Chemicals, Inc. . 770 F. 2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1985). Scop is 
particularly relevant. The defendant in Scop was convicted of 
federal securities fraud. At trial, the government offered 
opinion evidence through an SEC official whom it offered as an 
expert witness. The opinions of the witness, taken as a whole, 
were in essence that the defendant' s actions constituted 
"manipulation" and "fraud." Scop. 846 F. 2d at 138. The Scop 
court found that use of statutory language to state the opinion 
-15-
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of the witness constitutes a legal conclusion which is improper 
and should be excluded: 
Had Whitten [the witness] merely testified that 
controlled buying and selling of the kind alleged here 
can create artificial price levels to lure outside 
investors, no sustainable objection could have been 
made. Instead Whitten made no attempt to couch the 
opinion testimony in even conclusory factual statements 
but drew directly on the language of the statute and 
accompanying regulations concerning "manipulation" and 
"fraud." In essence, his opinions were legal 
conclusions that were highly prejudicial and went well 
beyond his province as an expert in securities trading. 
Id. at 140. This was compounded with the problem, as the Scop 
court noted, that statutory terms like "manipulation" and "scheme 
to defraud" are not self-defining, but have been the subject of 
diverse judicial interpretation. £&. 
Other securities cases note the problems associated 
with use of "securities experts'" testimony regarding legal 
standards. The seminal case is Marx & Co. . Inc. v. Diner7 s Club, 
Inc. , 550 F. 2d 505 (2d Cir. 1977), cert, denied 434 U.S. 861 
(1977). In Marx, a "securities expert" rendered testimony as to 
what he thought the term "best efforts" meant in a contract, and 
whether or not the defendants in that case had used "best 
efforts. " l£i. at 509. The expert testified that failure to 
issue a registration statement within 70 days was proof that the 
defendants failed to use "best efforts." This testimony 
constituted an opinion as to the "reasonableness" of delay in 
registration. Id. at 511. The court noted that securities fraud 
-16-
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litigation presents a special danger of abuse of expert witness 
testimony: "With the growth of intricate securities litigation . 
. . we must be especially careful not to allow trials before 
juries to become battles of paid advocates posing as experts on 
the respective sides concerning matters of domestic law. " 550 
F. 2d at 511. See also Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co. . 807 F. 2d 
359 (4th Cir. 1986) (testimony of legal experts in securities 
fraud cases presents significant conceptual problems which reach 
beyond securities issues).9 The analysis in Scop and other 
securities fraud cases, not Leuben, applies here. Like the term 
"manipulation," "materiality" is not a self-defining term, and 
Cook' s testimony was couched in statutory terms. 10 
The Court of Appeals disregarded this precedent, (Ct. 
App. Opinion, p. 10 n. 9), and relied instead on United States v. 
9Both Marx and Adalman implicitly recognize the risk that 
experts in areas of law have their own ideas not only as to what 
the law requires, but what they think it should require. Often, as 
here, this line is blurred in the mind of the witness, let alone 
the juror's minds. 
10The Court of Appeals averted this issue by making the 
remarkable comment that it believed Cook used the term "material" 
in a "factual" way. (Ct. App. Opinion p. 10). In light of the 
court7 s holding that materiality is an element of the offense 
charged and the undue deference the jury would accord to Mr. Cook, 
the "expert," and the confusion attendant to this hairsplitting 
distinction, the court' s conclusion cannot withstand scrutiny. 
Further, in making that comment, the court must implicitly admit 
that the term "material" must in some cases at least constitute a 
legal conclusion. This exchange highlights one of the many 
inherent difficulties in permitting experts in securities cases to 
testify as to what does and does not meet statutory and regulatory 
standards. 
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Leuben. Unlike Matthews and SCOP. Leuben was not a securities 
fraud case and did not even involve actual testimony; the holding 
was that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the 
government to put on expert testimony on the issue of materiality 
but excluding similar testimony by the defense. Leuben, 812 F. 2d 
at 184. Further, the Leuben court noted that the parties had 
already assumed that for a claim under 18 U.S. C. § 1001 the issue 
of materiality was an issue of fact, while for a claim under 18 
U. S. C. § 1004 it was a question of law. !£. at 183 n. 3. The 
court concluded that it need not decide whether these assumptions 
were correct apparently because its decision did not turn on that 
distinction. Ij|. 
Attempting to apply Leuben in this very different 
securities fraud case, the Court of Appeals seems to read Rule 
704 to mean that opinion testimony is admissible if it goes to an 
issue of ultimate fact because, by definition, it is not a legal 
conclusion. (Ct. App. Opinion p. 10). This approach is 
inadequate and stands Rule 704 on its head. Under Rule 704, 
evidence is not admissible because it goes to an ultimate fact; 
rather it cannot be excluded only because it goes to an issue of 
ultimate fact. The testimony may be inadmissible for other 
reasons, where, as here, an opinion embodies a legal conclusion 
(even if the same testimony relates to an "ultimate fact"). 
-18-
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The intent of Rule 704 is to eliminate the labelling 
problem created by the ultimate fact rule. Yet, the approach of 
the Court of Appeals is to replace it with just another label. 
To say that an issue is one of ultimate fact and not a legal 
opinion simply states the result and does nothing to clarify the 
basis for this determination. "Materiality" in the context of a 
securities fraud claim cannot be neatly labelled as a legal or a 
fact issue; it is a conclusion reached by applying an objective 
legal standard to a set of facts. The appropriate analysis 
should thus focus not on simplistic labelling of an expert' s 
opinion as fact or law, but on whether the expert improperly 
supplants the judge as law giver and jury instructor or whether, 
as we explain below, he or she provides "opinions phrased in 
terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. " 846 F. 2d at 140. 
The principle problem with Cook' s testimony is not that 
he gave evidence of the factual predicate for materiality; the 
error occurred when he was permitted in effect to instruct the 
jury that in his opinion the facts presented by the government 
meet the legal standard of materiality. (Transcript Vol. VI pp. 
86, 89, 91). Cook's testimony evidences the prejudice that 
results when these rules are misapplied: 
Q: And if there is a change that the seller realizes 
later on after he has used the document disclosing 
the investment manager will function, what is the 
proper way of dealing with that? 
Mr. Keller: Objection, 702. 
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Court: Overruled. 
A: Investor should be informed of that change and 
given a chance to get out of the investment. 
Besides the obvious problem that Mr. Cook was permitted 
to give his opinion as to what the law requires, there is the 
additional problem that what he said is at least incomplete and 
misleading, if not wrong. The above question in effect asks Mr. 
Cook if, in his opinion, an offeror has a legal duty to correct 
or update offering materials. It is unclear whether the question 
is limited to the offering period or whether the obligation is 
absolute and continuing. While no Utah authority appears on this 
issue, under federal securities law the duty to update or correct 
is highly fact and time sensitive. See, e. g. , Ross v. A. H. 
Robbins Co. , Inc. . 465 F. Supp. 904 (S. D. N. Y. 1979), rev' d on 
other grounds 607 F. 2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, denied 446 U.S. 
946. 
The above exchange reveals that Mr. Cook stated a broad 
legal standard without qualification. This kind of testimony not 
only constitutes a legal conclusion, but because its correctness 
depends on facts not presented (by the evidence or 
hypothetically), it is equally excludable as an opinion "phrased 
in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria. " Scop, 846 
F. 2d at 140. This defect cannot be corrected simply by 
permitting cross-examination, rebuttal, or a corrective 
instruction. See, e. g. , United States v. Zipkin, 729 F. 2d 384 
-20-
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(6th Cir. 1984) (testimony by bankruptcy judge as to effect of 
order he entered in bankruptcy proceedings and availability of 
interim fees not curable by cross to demonstrate error as to 
law). 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Court should grant 
certiorari and settle these two important questions. 
DATED this 9th day of March, 1992. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
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Joel G. Momberger 
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BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
C. Dean Larsen appeals his conviction of eighteen counts of 
securities fraud and theft on the ground that the Office of the 
Utah Attorney General (the Attorney General) should have been 
disqualified from the case for a conflict of interest. Larsen 
further asserts that formal investigation into wrongdoing was 
prompted by disclosure of confidential information from his 
attorney, and constituted an etnical violation. Larsen also 
challenges the admissibility cf opinion testimony by the State's 
expert, the court's failure to prombit certain evidence, and its 
refusal to give certain ^ury instructions. We affirm. 
In the early 1970s, C. Dean Larsen, an attorney with a 
background in real estate that predated his law career, filed 
articles of incorporation for what became a real estate 
development company known as Granada, Inc. (Granada). Larsen 
served as president cf Granada, a closely held corporation owned 
by him and memners of his family. According to Larsen, Granada 
was "inactive*" during the first few years after incorporation, 
development- The projects ranged from housing developments and 
apartments, to office buildings and a shopping center. The 
projects were mostly concentrated along Utah's Wasatch Front at 
first, but eventually they included real estate developments in 
Arizona and Nevada. The first fifteen or twenty projects were 
also very successful. 
In simple terms, the capital for most of the projects was 
provided by Larsen's law clients, typically doctors and dentists 
for whom he had set up professional corporations and pension 
plans. These clients invested retirement and pension monies in 
various limited partnerships Larsen formed for real estate 
development. Granada served as general partner in many of the 
limited partnerships, and acted as manager in others when a 
different general partner was named. In all, close to one 
hundred real estate limited partnerships were organized.1 
Granada had no employees during the first eight years after 
its incorporation, but hired its first employee in 1979. More 
employees were hired as Granada grew. Larsen said that, with 
this growth, he spent more of his time with Granada, and less 
time with his law practice. Larsen thereupon hired Brian Farr, a 
recently licensed attorney. 
Larsen claims he nired Farr as his own personal attorney to 
advise him in representing his clients, thereby creating an 
attorney-client relationship nested within another attorney-
client relationship. Although Larsen disputes that Farr was ever 
an associate, except briefly, he referred several legal matters 
to Farr to be performed on behalf of his clients. Larsen also 
assigned Farr some legal work of a personal nature, such as a 
parking violation by an office vehicle, pro bono litigation, a 
land sale, and preparing amendments to an unrelated family 
partnership as new family memoers were born. Larsen further 
assigned Farr some Granada-related projects, such as evictions 
and a health plan. 
Larsen supervised Farr's work throughout their working 
"relationship." Farr reported the hours he worked to Larsen, who 
then billed the clients. In turn, the clients paid Larsen, and 
Larsen paid Farr for his services through an account in tne name 
of Larsen's professional corporation. The Larsen-Farr 
relationship lasted approximately four years. 
1. Of these entities, only the limited partnerships known as The 
Oaks, Ltd., Three Crowns, Baseline, and EFF Fund, Ltd., were 
involved in the forty-two count amended information. 
Larsen and Farr sometimes conferred together with clients. 
According to Farr, during one such meeting, after setting up a 
professional corporation and a pension plan for a doctor and his 
wife, Larsen explained about certain reporting requirements that 
were involved. Larsen informed the clients that an accountant, a 
bank or a specialized pension accounting service could discharge 
those duties. Farr asserted that Larsen discouraged the clients 
from using a bank or an accountant, but recommended that they use 
Professional Pension Services (PPS), an entity that Larsen said 
dealt exclusively with pension matters. Larsen also told the 
clients that if they were to use PPS, they would like its liquid 
mortgage fund because investments in the fund required no minimum 
deposit and carried no penalty for early withdrawal. It appears 
from the record that PPS was loaning the fund proceeds to 
Granada-related projects. 
Farr claimed that Larsen failed, m recommending PPS, to 
disclose his former ownership of or continuing influence over 
PPS. Farr believed these omissions could put the clients' 
investments at risk. After the meeting, Farr contacted PPS at 
the request of the clients for information about the liquid 
mortgage fund. He learned that PPS did not have an offering 
statement or any agreement regarding the use of the liquid 
mortgage fund. Farr's concerns were further heightened when he 
was unable to find any recorded trust deeds securing the loans. 
After reviewing files at Granada and receiving additional 
information from PPS, Farr discovered that these problems were 
widespread. 
Farr spoke to Larsen about what he had learned and perceived 
to be a problem. Larsen assured him that the matter would be 
resolved. Despite tnese assurances, notning was done. Farr 
continued to press Larsen for a resolution and even volunteered 
to handle the matter. Larsen rejected tne offer, and hired 
outside counsel to research any possible violations of state 
securities laws. As a result of the growing tension between 
Larsen and Farr, their worx relationsnip was severed in 1932.* 
Following the breaKup, Farr continued to be concerned acout 
the interests of former "clients,'* especially their investments 
in Granada. As a result of what he perceived to be ongoing 
securities violations, Farr contacted Constance White of the Utah 
Securities Division (Securities Division; m 1933. Farr told 
2. Larsen claims that Farr's failure to make partner was the 
reason for the breakup as well as his motive in reporting Larsen 
to the Utah Securities Division, a rather telling statement m 
view of Larsen's claim that Farr was never even an associate m 
any meaningful sense. 
White what he knew about Granada based on what he had seen, was 
told, or had heard. White then turned the matter over to the 
Securities Division staff for investigation. Later, in 1986, 
Farr was employed by the Attorney General in the Health Division. 
Concurrent with these events, Granada began to experience 
serious cash flow shortages and its investments suffered. Larsen 
claimed he believed Granada was solvent, and sought Securities 
Division approval for a new mortgage fund offering by Granada. 
In early 1987, Larsen learned that the figures he relied on were 
inaccurate. The Securities Division told Larsen that Granada 
would be placed in receivership if Granada did not petition for 
bankruptcy. Granada then petitioned for bankruptcy in February 
1987. 
On October 19, 1988, the State filed a fifty-count criminal 
complaint against Larsen. The complaint alleged that Larsen had 
committed securities fraud and related acts of dishonesty in the 
sale of securities. Larsen was bound over on forty-two counts 
following a motion to amend and a lengthy preliminary hearing. 
Larsen then moved to sever the trial into five parts in order to 
more closely align the victims, dates, transactions, and entities 
involved. The trial court granted the motion and Larsen went to 
trial on the eighteen counts of securities fraud involving EFF 
Fund, Ltd. (EFF Fund or EFF). 
Larsen then moved to disqualify the Attorney General on the 
ground that Farr's subsequent employment with the State, when 
coupled with his previous disclosures to the Securities Division, 
posed a conflict of interest that should have been imputed to the 
entire office of the Attorney General. After a two-day hearing 
in which Farr, Larsen, and White testified, the district court 
denied the motion. 
Larsen filed a written opposition to the ruling, and filed 
an interlocutory appeal, both of which were denied. Before 
trial, Larsen moved to prohibit testimony about any entities 
other than EFF Fund, but the motion was denied. Larsen also 
moved to prohibit inquiry into the investigation by the 
Securities Division that led to the eventual suspension of EFF. 
That motion was deferred until trial. After a two-week trial, a 
jury found Larsen guilty of all eighteen counts. 
II. DISQUALIFICATION 
A. Attorney-Client Relationship 
Larsen argues that the Attorney General should have been 
disqualified from prosecuting the case against him because Farr's 
employment with the Health Division mandated disqualification 
under the imputed conflict of interest rule. See Utah Rules of 
Professional Conduct Rule 1.10 (1990). Larsen also contends that 
his conviction should be reversed because Farr's disclosures to 
the Securities Division violated certain ethical duties of 
confidentiality owed to Larsen as a former client of Farr. The 
threshold issue of both these arguments is whether an attorney-
client relationship existed. C£. Williams v. Barber, 765 P.2d 
387, 839 (Utah 1988)(threshold inquiry in legal malpractice is 
whether an attorney-client relationship existed). The trial 
court found that Farr was not Larsen's attorney except for a few 
minor transactional natters unrelated to securities or the 
criminal charges against him in this case, and denied Larsen's 
motion to disqualify. 
To prove that the trial court's findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous, "an appellant must marshal all evidence in 
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then 
demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings of fact.11 Saunders v. Sharp, 306 P.2d 198, 
199-200 (Utah 1990). If an appellant fails to marshal the 
evidence, "the appellate court assumes that the record supports 
the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the 
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the 
application of that law m the case." Id. at 199. 
Larsen challenges several factual findings of the trial 
court concerning the nature or extent of their professional 
relationship,3 but admits he "may have fallen somewhat short" in 
3. Larsen challenges the following factual findings on appeal: 
(1) that Farr was an associate of Larsen in the practice of law; 
(2) that Farr occasionally performed legal work: for Larsen 
personally; (3) that the legal work involved minor transactions 
unrelated to the matters or issues pending in this prosecution; 
(4) that Farr did not represent Larsen while serving common 
clients; (5) that, if an attorney client relationship existed 
between Farr and Larsen, it was related only to minor 
transactional matters, and not to any matter substantially 
related to the prosecution; (6) that Farr was not general counsel 
for Granada; (7) that Farr performed legal work for Granada in a 
(continued..T) 
marshaling the evidence. Larsen even goes so far as to suggest 
that he was prevented from doing so because of page limitations 
imposed upon him.4 Our insistence on compliance with the 
marshaling requirement is not a case of exalting hypertechnical 
adherence to form over substance. "A reviewing court is entitled 
to have the issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited 
and is not simply a depository in which the appealing party may 
dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishopr 753 
P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988)(quoting Williamson v. Oosahl. 92 111. 
App. 3d 1087, 1089, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (1981)). The marshaling 
requirement provides the appellate court the basis from which to 
conduct a meaningful review of facts challenged on appeal. See 
Wright v. Westside Nursery. 787 P.2d 508, 512 n.2 (Utah App. 
1990)(the purpose of the marshaling requirement is to spare 
appellate courts the onerous burden of combing through the record 
in search of supporting factual matters). 
Larsen argued only "selected evidence favorable to [his] 
position,11 Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah 
1991), without presenting any of the evidence supporting the 
trial court's findings. Larsen's approach "does not begin to 
meet the marshaling burden [he] must carry." Ld. Because Larsen 
failed to marshal evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings and show how they are clearly erroneous, we affirm the 
factual findings of the trial court that Farr was not Larsen's 
personal attorney, except in a few minor transactional matters 
unrelated to this prosecution.5 
3. (...continued) 
few minor matters; (3) that the work was unrelated to the matters 
and issues pending in this prosecution; and (9) that Farr's 
representation ceased prior to 1983. 
4. Larsen was allowed to file an cverlength brief of 81 pages 
after his request to file a 120-page brief was denied. The 81-
page brief was supplemented by five volumes of supporting addenda 
that made extensive reference to memoranda of points and 
authorities in the briefs filed below, thereby, circumventing any 
size restrictions. Given this leeway, the argument that Larsen 
was prevented from marshaling is somewhat disingenuous. 
5. Larsen asserts that it was his suo^ective belief that Farr 
was his personal attorney in all things, out fails to present any 
evidence of conduct that would warrant an implied attorney-client 
relationship. See, e.g., Maraulies v. Unchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 
1200 (Utah 1985) (an attorney-client relationship was implied 
where the law firm had represented a limited partnership in which 
the would-be clients had invested); 3reuer-Harrison, Inc. v. 
(continued...] 
B. Substantial Factual Relationship Test 
Having affirmed the trial court's finding regarding the 
limited nature of the attorney-client relationship between Farr 
and Larsen, we review its decision to not disqualify the Attorney 
General. The parties agree that the applicable standard 
governing disqualification is set forth in Rule 1.10(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides as follows 
(with our emphasis): 
When a lawyer becomes associated with a 
firm, the firm may not knowingly represent a 
person in the same or a substantially 
factually related matter in which that 
lawyer, or firm with which the lawyer has 
associated, had previously represented a 
client whose interests are materially adverse 
to that person and about whom the lawyer had 
acquired information protected by Rules 1.6 
and 1.9(b) that is material to the matter. 
Whether the matters m which Farr represented Larsen were 
"the same or substantially factually related" to the current case 
is a critical factor in the disqualification calculus. The trial 
court found that Farr's representation of Larsen was limited to a 
handful of legal matters unrelated to the securities or criminal 
charges against him. 
On appeal, Larsen offered no argument that the matters in 
which the trial court found Farr had represented him were the 
same or substantially related to the matters for which 
disqualification is new sought. Unless a substantial factual 
relationship is shown between the matters, disqualification is 
not required under the rule cecause the most basic element is not 
present. Our conclusion that there is no substantial 
relationship is supported by the fact that Farr learned of the 
perceived securities problems outside the scope of the legal 
representation of Larsen expressly undertaken. When Farr 
5. (...continued) 
Combe, 799 P.2d 716, 727-28 (Utah App. 1990) (although an 
attorney-client relationship may be implied by the parties' 
conduct, a would-be client's belief that a professional 
relationship exists must have been reasonably induced by the 
attorney's conduct). C£. Atkinson v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 798 P.2d 
733, 735 (Utah 1990)(courts consider who the attorney claimed to 
have represented as shown by the pleadings and other documents; 
the existence of an employment contract or retainer agreement; 
and the parties' admissions about the relationship)". 
confronted Larsen about the problems, Larsen rejected Farr's 
offer to handle the matter and hired outside counsel. 
Absent a substantial factual relationship between the former 
and present matters, no attorney-client relationship can be 
imposed on Farr with respect to this litigation, and "there could 
be no conflict of interest created" by Farr's subsequent 
employment with the Attorney General. Maroulies v. UpchurchP 696 
P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985). Accordingly, we conclude that, 
inasmuch as disqualification of the Attorney General was not 
mandated under Rule 1.10(b) of the Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to 
allow the Attorney General to remain as counsel. Id. 
Further, we also reject Larsen's argument that the mere 
appearance of impropriety is sufficient to overturn his 
conviction. In State v. Ford, 793 P.2d 397 (Utah App. 1990), 
this court said that a criminal defendant "is not automatically 
entitled to a reversal of his conviction" merely because of an 
apparent violation of a rule of professional conduct. Id, at 
400. If Farr violated any ethical rules, the "appropriate remedy 
lies with the disciplinary arm of the Utah State Bar." Id. 
III. EXPERT OPINION 
Larsen argues that the court erred in allowing the former 
registration chief of the Securities Division, an attorney now 
serving as a securities examiner in Nevada, to offer expert 
opinion testimony concerning the "materiality" of information not 
disclosed to investors. Larsen asserts that the opinion was 
improper legal testimony, not factual testimony. Whether or not 
the information was "material" is an element of securities 
fraud.6 
6. It is unlawful for any person, in 
connection with the offer, sale, or purchase 
of any security, directly or indirectly to: 
(1) employ any device, scheme, 
or artifice to defraud; 
(2) make any untrue statement 
of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not 
misleading; or 
(continued...) 
It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine 
the suitability of expert testimony in a particular case, State 
v. Clavton. 646 P.2d 723, 726 (Utah 1982), and we will not 
reverse that determination on appeal in the "absence of a clear 
showing of abuse." Lamb v. Banqart, 525 P.2d 602, 607-08 (Utah 
1974) . Expert testimony is suitable if it will "assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in 
issue . . • ." Utah R. Evid. 702. In general, expert testimony 
is suitable in securities fraud cases because the technical 
nature of securities is not within the knowledge of the average 
layman or a subject within common experience and would help the 
jury understand the issues before them. See Dixon v. Stewart, 
658 P.2d 591, 597 (Utah 1982). 
Under Rule 704 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, expert opinion 
is "not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier of fact".7 Despite the appropriateness of 
expert testimony on an ultimate issue, Rule 704 was not intended 
to allow experts to give legal conclusions. See Davidson v. 
Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah App. 1991)(citing Owen v. Kerr-
McGee Corp., 698 F.2d 236, 240 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
The danger of allowing expert opinion couched as a legal 
standard is that "the jurors will turn to the expert, rather than 
to the judge, for guidance on the applicable law." 3 Jack B. 
Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein' s Evidence. \ 704[02]. 
See also First Sec. Bank v. Banberrv Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 
1258 (Utah 1989)(legal duty owed by trust deed trustee to trustor 
is question of law to be determined by the court, and not 
question of fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate 
law); Ashton v. Ashton. 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987) (attorney's 
expert opinion as to effect of joint tenant's conveyance was 
inadmissible statement of law). The determination of whether 
expert opinion embraces an ultimate factual issue or constitutes 
a legal conclusion is a difficult call because "[tjhere is no 
bright line between permissible questions under Rule 704 and 
6. (. . .continued) 
(3) engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as 
a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1 (1989): 
7. Black's Law Dictionary 1057 (6th ed. 1991) defines an 
ultimate issue as "[tjhat question which must finally be answered 
as, for= example, the defendant's negligence is the .ultimate issue 
in a personal injury action." 
those that call for overbroad legal responses," Davidson, 813 
P.2d at 1231.8 
The distinction between a factual evidentiary showing of 
materiality and impermissible opinion on the legal question of 
materiality was underscored in United States v. Lueben, 812 F.2d 
179, 183 (5th Cir. 1987). In Lueben. the Fifth Circuit held that 
expert opinion on materiality was admissible as being fact-
oriented. The court reasoned that whether certain false 
statements would have had "the capacity to influence" a loan 
officer as a factual element of the government's case was 
distinguishable from the question of whether the statements were 
legally "material." Z£. at 184. The government was required to 
make an initial factual showing of materiality as an element of 
its case. The Fifth Circuit ruled that the district court, 
therefore, committed reversible error in not allowing expert 
testimony since the defendant would have been entitled to a 
directed verdict of acquittal if the government was unable to 
prove each element of its case. Id. at 185. 
Although Lueben involved a prosecution for making false 
statements in connection with a loan application and tax returns, 
rather than securities violations, the case illustrates the 
distinction between permissible fact-oriented questions as to 
materiality and impermissible legal conclusions referred to in 
the cases cited by Larsen.' Accordingly, we are persuaded by 
Lueben that use of the terra "material" may be admitted as 
permissible fact-oriented testimony. Upon review of the record, 
we conclude that the expert in this case used the term "material" 
in a factual sense. 
8. See State v. Span, 170 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 17-18, 26 n.l (Utah 
1991) (arson investigator testified that fire was intentionally 
set); American Concept Ins. Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 273 
(Utah App. 1988) (expert could submit affidavit as to ultimate 
issues of lack of good faith and fair dealing in suit for 
tortious interference with business relations). See also Davis 
v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1484-85 (9th Cir. 1991)(police 
expert could testify that county sheriff was "reckless" in 
failing to adequately train his deputies, and that there was a 
causal link between this recklessness and plaintiffs's injuries); 
United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 905 (11th Cir. 1990)(police 
detective could use the term "conspiracy," since testimony was 
factual and not a legal conclusion). 
9. See United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135 (2nd Cir. 1988); 
Adalman v. Baker, Watts & Co., 807 F.2d 359 (4th Cir. 1986); and 
Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc.. 550 F.2d-~505 (2nd Cir. 
1977) . 
Since the State is required to prove all essential elements 
of a crime, and materiality is an element of the offense charged 
in this case, there was no abuse of discretion in allowing the 
expert testimony- See State v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 
1989)(state has a right to introduce evidence on every element). 
Furthermore, any confusion that might have been created by the 
casual use of the term "material'1 and its legal definition could 
have been corrected with a jury instruction. See Conger v. Tel 
Tech. Inc.. 798 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Ortiz, 
782 P.2d 959, 962 (Utah App. 1989). 
IV. MOTIONS IN LIMINE 
A. EFF Fund 
Larsen brought a motion in limine to prohibit the State from 
introducing testimony concerning any entities other than EFF Fund 
on the ground that any such evidence was irrelevant to the 
eighteen counts of securities fraud severed for trial.10 The 
State asserted that the evidence was relevant because: EFF had 
been set up similarly to the other entities; Larsen had told 
investors that EFF would be operated the same way as PPS; the 
claim as to similarity was an inducement for investment; and the 
partnerships all received money from EFF because of their 
structural similarity. 
The State also claimed that Larsen had promised the 
investors that the loans were secured by promissory notes, but 
that these documents were only partially completed or non-
existent. Although the trial court instructed the State that it 
could not delve into specific acts of misconduct, the court 
denied Larsen's motion, stating that the government was entitled 
to pursue its theory of the case. On appeal, Larsen claims his 
conviction should be reversed because of prejudicial error 
inasmuch as the evidence was irrelevant and immaterial. 
"Relevant evidence'1 is defined as that "evidence having a 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence 
to the determination of the action more probable or less 
probable11 and is admissible unless excluded. Utah R. Evid. 401 
10. In particular, Larsen objected to the State's inquiries into 
how Granada raised money to acquire and develop properties; how 
the liquid mortgage fund or its counterpart, the PPS fund, 
operated; how EFF money was used; what limitations were imposed 
on the fund; whether EFF was ever investigated; the significance 
of certain portions of a registration statement; and which 
properties received monies from EFF. 
and 402. See generally State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 
1986) . Rule 403 states that "relevant evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is found to be substantially outweighed by 
the potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah 
R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added)• Thus, in determining whether 
relevant evidence should be excluded, "[ejvidence that tends to 
prove an element of the crime is admissible. Evidence which goes 
to general disposition or that is unfairly prejudicial is not 
admissible." State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
The explanations given by the State regarding the relevance 
of the other entities to EFF were cogent to the legal test of 
relevance because they tended to make the existence of facts 
concerning the alleged securities violations more or less 
probable than without the evidence. The trial court had a legal 
basis, therefore, to admit the evidence. See State v. Ramirez. 
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 16 n.3 (1990). 
Larsen does not challenge the merits of any of the reasons 
given by the State as to relevance. Larsen's claim as to 
relevance is based solely on the grounds that the EFF Fund, the 
liquid mortgage fund, and the other partnerships were separate 
entities. Larsen mistakenly asserts that the trial court's 
severance of those claims bars any discussion of those entities. 
The relevance of these other entities to the other charges, as 
the trial court pointed out, does not preclude their relevance to 
the EFF Fund. 
Larsen also made no argument on how evidence of the other 
entities confused the issues or misled the jury. The trial 
court's cautionary instruction prohibiting the State from delving 
into other acts of misconduct adequately balanced the apparent 
concerns for unfair prejudice. The trial court, therefore, did 
not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. 
B, Investigation by the Securities Division 
Larsen also brought a motion in limine to prevent testimony 
regarding an investigation of Granada by the Securities Division, 
claiming that the evidence would be "highly prejudicial." 
-Without holding a hearing or ruling on the motion, the trial 
court indicated in a minute entry that consideration of the 
matter would be deferred until trial. The testimony was later 
admitted at trial over Larsen's objection. On appeal, Larsen 
contends the testimony should have been excluded as impermissible 
character evidence under Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
11
 [I]n order to preserve a contention of 
error in the admission of evidence for 
appeal, a defendant must raise a timely 
objection to the trial court in clear and 
specific terms. Where there [is] no clear or 
specific objection on the basis of character 
evidence or unfair prejudice and the specific 
ground for objection [is] not clear from the 
context of the question or the testimony, the 
theory cannot be raised on appeal." 
State v. Schreuder, 726 P.2d 1215, 1222 (Utah 1986)(footnote 
omitted). 
Although Larsen claims he objected "at every opportunity at 
trial," no Rule 404 character evidence objections were made. 
Larsen objected to the State asking questions in improper form, 
assuming facts not in evidence, asking for irrelevant and 
immaterial evidence, and asking for evidence which, although 
relevant, should have been excluded under Rule 403. 
Larsen's objections as to form, relevance, materiality, 
leading nature and so on do not call the court's attention to 
impermissible character evidence and the theory is not clear from 
the context. See State v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), 
cert, denied, U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989); Schreuder. 726 
P.2d at 1222. Because no proper objection was made, Larsen has 
not preserved the issue for appeal and we do not address the 
issue further. 
V, REMAINING ISSUES 
A. Specific Intent 
Larsen argues that the trial court's refusal to give his 
proposed jury instructions on specific intent was reversible 
error. Although a criminal defendant is entitled to have the 
jury instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any basis 
in the evidence to support that theory, jury instructions should 
not incorrectly or misleadingly state the law. State v. Aly, 782 
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989)). 
The common law terms "general intent" and "specific intent" 
have not been used in the Utah criminal code since substantive 
amendments in 1973. See State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 
1987). See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990). 
The Utah Code specifies willfulness as the culpable mental 
state for securities fraud. "Any person who willfully violates 
any provision of this chapter . . • or willfully violates any 
rules or order under this chapter . . . shall upon conviction be 
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than three 
years, or both." Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-21 (1990)(emphasis 
added). The trial court, therefore, properly instructed the jury 
that the culpable mental state for the crime of securities fraud 
is "willfulness,M rather than specific intent as proposed by 
Larsen. The court defined willfulness as follows: 
You are instructed that a person engages in 
conduct intentionally or with intent or 
willfully, with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to the result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
The instruction on willfulness mirrors the statutory 
definition of willfulness under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) 
(1990). Moreover, because "willfully" is alternatively listed 
with "intentionally" or "with intent," the instruction is not 
inconsistent with State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976) 
(crime of securities fraud does not require element of loss and 
causal connection, since the crime is complete under section 61-
1-1(1) if defendant intentionally employs any device, scheme or 
artifice to defraud). Tnasmuch as willfulness is the culpable 
mental state, a separate instruction on specific intent was 
unnecessary. 
B. Other Jury Instructions and Leading Questions 
We have also reviewed the remaining issues raised on appeal 
and deem them to be without merit. In our discretion, we do not 
address them further. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 883 
(Utah 1989). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Farr's subsequent employment with the Attorney General did 
not mandate disqualification because there was no attorney-client 
relationship between him and Larsen that would have created a 
conflict of interest. Expert opinion on the issue of materiality 
was admissible as fact-oriented testimony concerning an element 
of the government's prima facie case. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of entities other than 
EFF Fund because of their relevance to the issues of securities 
fraud. Larsen did not object to the character evidence 
complained of, and thereby failed to preserve the issue for 
appeal. The culpable mental state of securities fraud is 
willfulness and the-trial court's instruction on the element was 
proper. 
^Accordingly, Larsen's conviction and sentence are affirmed, 
Russell w. Bench, 
Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
>4J^ 
Norman H. Jackson, fjudqe 
I CONCUR IN PARTS 11(A), IV(B), V(A), AND V(B), AND OTHERWISE 
CONCUR ONLY IN THE RESULT: 
GregoiyrK. Orme, Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OO0OO 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
C. DEAN LARSEN, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
C. Dean Larsen, by and through his counsel of record, hereby 
requests that the following jury instructions be given by the Court 
in this case. 
Further, the Defendant requests leave to offer such other 
additional instructions as, during the course of the trial, become 
appropriate. 
1. The Court's usual instructions on the following subjects: 
a. Verdict/Jury's responsibility. 
b. Province of the court. 
c. Province of the jury. 
COirr? 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
The crimes charged in this case are serious crimes which 
require proof of specific intent before the Defendant can be 
convicted. Specific intent, as the term implies, means more than 
the general intent to commit the act. To establish specific intent 
the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
Defendant willfully did an act which the law forbids, or willfully 
failed to do an act which the law requires, purposely intending to 
violate the law. Such intent may be determined from all the facts 
and circumstances surrounding the case. ^ •• A , /) 
1 U.C.A. §§ 61-1-1(2) and 61-1-21. 
2 1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, 
§ 14.03 (3d ed. 1977). 
3 Troutman v. U.S., 100 F.2d 628, 632-33 (10th Cir. 1939). 
4 Sparrow v. U.S., 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968). 
5 Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976), 
cert.denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). 
6 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
7 U.S. v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 11-12 (1976). 
8 Liparota v. U.S., 471 U.S. 419, 422-23, 433-34 (1985). 
9 State v. Facer, 552 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1976). 
10 State v. Haas, 675 P.2d 673, 678 (Ariz. 1983). 
11 U.S. v. Pearlstein, 576 F.2d 531, 537 (3d Cir. 1978). 
12 U.S. v. Payne, 474 F.2d 603, 604 (9th Cir. 1973). 
W 
r'M -> —o 
13 U.S. v. Danser, 26 F.R.D. 580, 588 (D.C. Mass. 1959), affirmed 
Danser v. U.S., 281 F.2d 492 (1st Cir. 1960). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
Under Utah law, a person engages in conduct "willfully" with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, 
when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
Thus, an act is done "willfully" if done voluntarily and 
intentionally, and with the specific intent to do something the law 
forbids; that is to say with bad purpose either to disobey or to 
disregard the law. 
An omission or a failure to act is done "willfully" if done 
voluntarily and intentionally, and with the specific intent to fail 
to do something the law requires; that is to say with bad purpose 
either to disobey or to disregard the law. . 
In this case, the bad purpose would be the specific intent %6 \fc 
defraud 
1 U.C.A. § 76-2-103(1). 
2 1 Devitt and Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice ^ Instructions, 
§ 14.06 (3d ed. 1977). 
3 See citations from previous requested Instruction No. 4. 
4 U.S. v. A. & P. Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958). 
5 Morissette v. U.S., 342 U.S. 246, 250, 252, 264 (1952). 
6 Screws v. U.S., 325 U.S. 91, 101-107 (1945). 
7 Hartzel v. U.S., 322 U.S. 680, 686 (1944). 
8 U.S. v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 303 U.S. 239, 242-243 (1939). 
9 Murdock v. U.S., 290 U.S. 389, 393-396 (1933). 
10 Hagner v. U.S., 285 U.S. 427, 429 (1932). OC-l.'.-rO 
11 Ellis v. U.S., 206 U.S. 246, 257 (1906). 
12 Marteney v. U.S., 218 F.2d 258, 263 (10th Cir. 1954), 
cert.denied 348 U.S. 953 (1955). 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
Before you can convict the Defendant of the crime of SECURI-
TIES FRAUD, as alleged in Count 11 of the Information, you must 
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the 
following elements of that crime: 
1. That the Defendant willfully made an untrue statement of 
a material fact; or 
2. That the Defendant willfully omitted to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of 
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and 
3. That any such statements or omissions by the Defendant 
were in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of a security, 
directly or indirectly; and 
4. That any such statements or omissions by the Defendant 
were made or omitted with the specific intent to defraud Anthony 
Middleton, Jr. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, it is your duty 
to find the Defendant guilty of SECURITIES FRAUD. 
On the other hand, if the evidence has failed to establish 
each and all of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, 
it is your duty to find the Defendant not guilty of SECURITIES 
FRAUD. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30 
You are instructed that a representation made by the Defendant 
in good faith constitutes a complete defense to a charge of 
Securities Fraud. Thus, the Defendant is not guilty of Securities 
Fraud if he had a good faith intention to carry out a promise or 
representation at the time he made the promise or representation. 
Even if the representation were false or based purely upon specula-
tion and caused an investor to rely upon the representation as 
true, it does not constitute Securities Fraud if the Defendant made 
the representation in good faith. 
Good faith, as commonly used, means a belief or state of mind 
denoting honesty of purpose, or freedom from intention to defraud. 
If the evidence in this case leaves you with a reasonable 
doubt whether the Defendant made a representation in good faith, 
then you should find the Defendant not guilty of Securities Fraud 
in regard to that representation. 
1 Sparrow v. U.S., 402 F.2d 826, 828-29 (10th Cir. 1968). 
2 U.S. v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1403 (10th Cir, 1988). 
3 Frank v. U.S., 220 F.2d 559, 564-65 (10th Cir. 1955). 
4 U.S. v. Bane, 583 F.2d 832 (6th Cir. 1978). 
5 State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211 (Utah 1985). 
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THE S1ATE OF ITAH. 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
C. DEAN LARSEN. 
Defendant:. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JLRY 
CRIMINAL NO. 891900927 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
\ou are instructed that the defendant C. DEAN LARSEN is 
charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission of SECURITIES FRAUD (18 COUNTS) . The Information 
alleges: 
COLNT 1 
SECURITIES FRAUD. On or about January 7, 1986, in Salt Lake 
Countv, Utah and in violation of Utah Code Ann., bection bl-1-
1(2) and 61-1-21, the defendant, C. DEAN LARSEN, in connection 
with the offer or sale of any security to Carles Flamand, 
directly or indirectly, willfullv made an untrue statement of a 
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessarv m 
order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which thev are made, not misleading. 
INSTRUCTION NO. W 
You are instructed that under the laws of the State of Utah 
a person commits securities fraud, if, in connection with the 
otfer or sale of any security, either directly or indirectly, he 
willfully makes or causes to be made any untrue statement of a 
material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in 
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances 
under which they were made, not misleading. 
r>/>^  ^ /^o 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' / 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct 
intentionally or with intent or willfully, with respect to the 
nature of his conduct or to the result of his conduct, when it is 
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
r> r* i " x o 
INSTRUTI 'JN NO .HA 
You are instructed that ignorance or mistake of fact which 
disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to anv 
prosecution for that crime. 
The culpable mental state for the crime of securities fraud 
is "willfulness." 
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1 Q Did you also touch upon disclosures with regard 
2 to limited offerings or private placements? 
3 A Yes, various aspects of those. For the most 
4 part, limited offerings, the disclosure in a limited 
5 offering, is established by me and the SEC in their 
6 guidelines and regulations. There are gaps in those 
7 disclosure requirements, and that is where the committee 
8 established some rules. 
9 Q Do you feel that you are familiar with both the 
10 state and the federal requirements of disclosure in 
11 limited offerings? 
12 J A Yes, because we were examiners, we were 
13 required to keep one eye on federal requirements and 
14 another eye on the state requirements. 
15 J Q What securities — Before we leave the North 
16 J American Securities Administration Association, let me 
17 I ask you how long you have been associated with that 
18 I organization. 
19 A Since working with Utah. So I started with 
20 I Utah in 1982. It has been eight years. 
21 J Q What seminars or special training might you 
22 J have had in the course of these eight years that helped 
23 you in your employment? 
24 J A Number of seminars. The SEC sponsors several 
25 I seminars during the year. The North American Securities 
42 
compilation of the disclosure that will go to an 
investor. That disclosure should be everything the 
investor really should know or would consider important 
in order to make an investment decision. 
Q And were you responsible to your employer to 
determine the adequacy of those disclosure documents that 
you reviewed? 
A Yes. 
Q And what are the types of things that you would 
look for in your examination of prospectuses or Private 
Placement Memorandums? 
A There is some basic disclosure that is required 
under state requirements and the federal requirements. 
There needs to be a disclosure about the owners, the 
people that are putting the things together, that are 
going to be running the business- You need to disclose 
what their background is, what their qualifications are, 
what problems they may have had in the past. 
Q Why is that important? 
A Well, because your investment decision is — it 
is important because the people that are going to be 
running the operation are the people that are pretty much 
going to dictate the success or failure of the operation. 
So you need to know about those people. 
Q What else are you concerned with when you 
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then a Certificate of Probable Cause should issue. 
Because if a question is close enough, it would be 
inherently unfair in our democratic society for someone 
to be imprisoned for months and months and months, some 
cases years, I suppose, for some Appellate Courts to deal 
with problems. We don't have that problem, fortunately, 
in the State of Utah. But nevertheless, that is a matter 
that we have great concern about. I believe that all 
things considered, all of the points brought up, but 
particularly the fact that this is a brand new statute, 
and the statute, the main charging statute itself is not 
very — it is not very clear because it does not state 
whether one should intentionally or willfully make the 
statement but then confuses it by later on saying "The 
punishment will be for one who willfully does it.M It 
sets forth what the penalty will be. 
Now, I do not believe — I believe I followed 
the State and 61-1-1 and combined it with 61-1-21 to find 
willfulness and I think that is the correct 
interpretation. But there is an argument that could be 
made, that since the charging statute itself mentioned 
nothing, it should have been specific intent. And that 
aloner over this past weekend, has given me my greatest 
concern. And I feel that in all fairness that it is a 
matter that must be resolved by the Appellate Court and 
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therefore I am going to grant the Petition for 
Certificate of Probable Cause. 
I grant the Certificate of Probable Cause, 
which brings us to the next point of — that is only part 
of the battle won as far as the state is concerned. Now, 
the question is, is he a security risk and should there 
be bail and, if so, how much? 
MR. KELLER: May I address that, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You want to do it at this time, you 
may proceed. 
MR. KELLER: Very good, Your Honor. Your 
Honor, Mr. Larsen came to me in August of 1988. At that 
time the Attorney General's Office investigation had been 
several months, even years in occurrence, and asked me to 
represent him. He was charged October 19th of 1988. He 
has made every single court appearance he has ever been 
requested to make. He has been on Pretrial Release 
through Pretrial Services and has never had a problem. 
He has been trusted and he has discharged that trust 
faithfully. He is a family man with eight children, 
lived in Utah all of his life. He is a very religious 
man. His family has been very supportive of him. There 
would be absolutely no reason in the world for him to 
change a course of conduct that he has undergone for the 
last two and a half years. 
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1 I the division if there is problems with the filings and it 
2 is not accepted. The division, if problems are 
3 discovered, we then prepare a deficiency letter, as it is 
4 I called, and submit it to the correspondent. 
5 J Q Now, turn, if you would please, to the fourth 
6 page in the document and can you explain to the jury what 
7 J that document is. 
8 A This is the cover page of this prospectus. The 
9 I prospectus again is the document that is supposed to 
10 contain all of the material disclosures that is intended 
11 J to go to investors. 
12 Q How large was the prospectus, do you remember? 
13 I A Well, the prospectus, including exhibits, 
14 J actually was a couple of binders. 
15 I Q Briefly, will you explain, if you would, what 
16 J determines what should be disclosed in the prospectus 
17 J side to be used in connection with the sale of securities 
18 side? 
19 I A In determining disclosures, there are specific 
20 I guidelines for what needs to be disclosed in every 
21 I offering and those are further established by state law 
22 J and, of course, federal law. Beyond those established 
23 J guidelines, the person reviewing the registration 
24 J statement or prospectus would have to make a judgment 
25 I call as to whether or not under the circumstances 
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additional disclosures need to be made. 
Q And do these disclosures vary from offering to 
offering? 
A Yes. 
Q What is the standard if a new angle comes up, 
how do you determine whether or not that is disclosed in 
the prospectus? 
A Well, again, you would look for any kind of 
guidelines that may establish a precedent and then you 
just very carefully look at the operation and you 
determine whether or not there is a specific piece of 
information that an investor would consider important in 
making a decision. And then if you determine that there 
is some information, then you insist it be disclosed. 
Q What is the intended use of the prospectus? 
Who gets the prospectus? 
A The investor is supposed to receive the 
prospectus. This is all the representations or this is 
suppose to contain all of the representations that the 
investor should receive and should be relied on in making 
an investment decision. 
Q So this document would contain those important 
facts that you talked about earlier an investor should 
know? 
A Yes, it should contain all of the material 
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memorandum to sell interest in EFF, Ltd. once the seller 
knew that such notes did not exist? 
MR. KELLER: Objection, it is leading, Your 
Honor. Secondly, under Rule 702 it is not a subject 
normally necessary for expert testimony. As I previously 
argued to the Court, it is inappropriate to ask such 
question. The jury can read the information and make its 
own conclusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled, the witness may answer. 
That may be answered yes or no, whether you have an 
opinion. 
THE WITNESS: Would you ask the question again? 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Yes. If promissory notes 
never existed as represented in the Private Placement 
Memorandum, do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
it would be appropriate or proper to use this document in 
selling investments in EFF, Ltd. once the seller knew 
that notes didn't exist? 
A It would not be proper. 
Q If this memorandum were used to make initial 
sales to investors and then subsequently the seller knew 
that the promissory notes did not exist, what if anything 
would be required before the seller could make additional 
sales to those same investors? 
MR. KELLER: Objection, same basis. 
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THE COURT: Overruled. You may answer. 
THE WITNESS: When there is a material change 
in the operation of the company, in most cases -- well, 
what should happen is that an amendment should be made to 
the prospectus for future offerees. But al30, people who 
have invested in the offering should be given a chance to 
review the material change in the company and decide 
whether or not they want to invest in that company. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) And will you tell the Court, 
please, whether or not amending this type of document is 
a common or uncommon practice. 
A It is very common. 
Q Do you review those amendments from time to 
time that take place in the securities industry? 
A Yes. 
Q And I believe that you testified, Mr. Cook, 
that you do not ordinarily review Private Placement 
Memorandums, but you do so on occasion? 
A Yes. 
Q And have you had an opportunity to review that 
document more than once? 
A Yes, in preparation for the testimony, yes. 
Q Let's say, Mr. Cook, that you had an 
opportunity to review this Private Placement Memorandum 
before it was used in sales. And let's say you knew the 
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PHOTOGRAPHER: Yes, I understand the rules. 
THE COURT: You may proceed. 
MR. GRIFFIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Do you recollect the facts, 
Mr. Cook? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
those facts ought to be disclosed in an offering document 
similar to that one? 
A Yes, I would consider that material information 
that an investor would like to know. 
Q You had talked earlier about compensation to 
insiders. Does that fall in that category? 
A Yes, it is compensation but it also goes to 
exactly what the general partners have at risk, whether 
or not they have an incentive to put forth every effort 
to make the operation successful. 
Q Now, assume also that you are examining a 
Private Placement Memorandum, if you will, with regard to 
a limited partnership. And you uncover that the general 
partner is actually not going to make the day-to-day 
decisions in that limited partnership. That will be 
delegated to someone else to make the important decisions 
and the day-to-day decisions. Would you want that to be 
disclosed as well? 
B9 
1 J A Yes. Again, that would be very important; for 
2 an investor to know. The limited partners, or the 
3 investors in a limited partnership look to the general 
4 partner for the operation, the success of the company. 
5 And the general partner is probably the most important 
6 part of the limited partnership. And if that general 
7 partner is, in fact, not the true general partner, that 
8 would be important for an investor to know. 
9 I Q You said that you understood the role of Equity 
10 I Terra, the investment manager in this particular limited 
11 J partnership. 
12 J A I have read the prospectus and I know what it 
13 J says about Equity Terra. 
14 I Q Let me put this question to you. Again, assume 
15 J that you are looking at a limited partnership and a 
16 1 Private Placement Memorandum, and there was an investment 
17 manager that was supposed to make sure that certain 
18 criteria were fulfilled before loans were made from the 
19 limited partnership funds. And assume, if you will, that 
20 the investment manager never met, never operated, never 
21 J exercised his prerogative or made a recommendation, would 
22 J you want those facts disclosed in a disclosure document 
23 to investors? 
24 MR. KELLER: Objection. Your Honor, the 
25 hypothetical is irrelevant to this particular case. I 
90 
would go further if the Court would allow me. 
THE COURT: You may come to the bench. 
(Off the record discussion between Court and 
counsel. ) 
THE COURT: Objection is overruled. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Cook, do you remember the 
facts and the hypothetical situation? 
A Would you ask it again? 
Q Let's suppose you were examining the limited 
partnership in which there is an investment manager that 
will make certain recommendations as to how money is 
going to be used from the limited partnership, 
specifically regarding certain loan criteria. And let's 
assume also that the investment manager never functioned, 
never made those recommendations and, in fact, ever met. 
Would you want those facts disclosed in a disclosure 
document to investors? 
A Yes, that would also be material. It goes to 
the essence of the operation and if there is a change in 
what is disclosed to investors, that should be — that 
information should be in the prospectus to begin with and 
an investor should be informed of that. 
Q And if there is a change that the seller 
realizes later on after he has used the document 
disclosing the investment manager will function, what is 
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the proper way of dealing with that? 
MR. KELLER: Objection, 702. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: Investors should be informed of 
that change and given a chance to get out of the 
investment. 
Q (By Mr. Griffin) Now, will you pick up again 
State's Exhibit 41-S and can you turn to page 44. I want 
to make sure you are at the right location, Mr. Cook. 
You see the paragraph on the page that begins 
"Furthermore"? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you read that sentence to the jury? 
A "Furthermore, trust deeds and other instruments 
of the Existing Projects, Three of which have a negative 
equity or a loss, will be put into the Collateral Pool 
with similar instruments from any new Projects to which 
Note proceeds are loaned." 
Q Now, this sentence discloses that there are 
three projects, three existing projects that have a 
negative equity or loss; is that correct? 
A Yes. 
MR. KELLER: Objection, Your Honor, that is 
leading. That is counsel's interpretation. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
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Q (By Mr. Griffin) Mr. Cook, was there a way to 
identify which of these projects are being referred to as 
the negative equity or loss projects? 
A Yes. Later on in the prospectus there is a 
little more information in the projects. 
Q Will you turn back to the numbered page 70 in 
the exhibit, and do you have that page? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you see section four, Commercial Club 
Building? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you read the second and third paragraphs 
in that section which are on page 71, beginning with the 
words "The Commercial Club Building." 
A "The Commercial Club Building was purchased in 
July of 1975, pursuant to purchase contract for 
approximately $750,000. As of December 31, 1985 the 
partnership had borrowed approximately $582,593 from 
Existing Utah Lenders through the Utah Liquid Mortgage 
Funds and $220,992 from Granada and Granada Limited 
Partnership to provide funds for improvements and to make 
payments on the purchase contract. There is a loan with 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. against the property 
with an outstanding balance of $652,134 with interest at 
the rate of 10 percent per annum and monthly payments of 
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POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION ON SPECIFIC INTENT TO DEFRAUD. 
Defendant claims that the trial committed reversible 
error in refusing to give his requested instructions on "specific 
intent to defraud" as an element of securities fraud. This claim 
is without merit. 
M[T]he framing of instructions lies in the trial 
court's discretion." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266 
(Utah 1988). "[T]he instructions should not incorrectly or 
misleadingly state the material rules of law. . . . However, 
beyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity of the 
jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity is left 
to the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Alv, 782 
P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Here, the trial court gave the following instruction 
defining "willfully"11: 
You are instructed that a person engages 
in conduct intentionally or with intent or 
willfully, with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to the result of his conduct, when 
it is his conscious desire to engage in the 
conduct or cause the result. 
Instruction No. 17 (R. 1312) (emphasis added). That instruction 
misstatements or omissions were material (see, e.g., R. 1289, 
1609, 1610, 1611). See State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120 (Utah 
1989) ("Errors we label 'harmless' are errors which . . . are 
sufficiently inconsequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affected the outcome of the 
proceedings."); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). 
11
 The culpable mental state "willfully" applies to section 
61-1-1(2), under which defendant was charged, through section 61-
• 34-
is nearly a verbatim recitation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) 
(1990)f which defines "willfully" to mean the same thing as 
"intentionally' or "with intent." Thus, the instruction 
accurately states the law, and, contrary to defendant's 
contention, is not inconsistent with State v. Facer, 552 P. 2d 
110, 111 (Utah 1976), which identifies the culpable mental state 
for securities fraud as "intentionally." Indeed, the court's 
instruction is entirely consistent with an assertion defendant 
makes twice in his brief: "[T]he culpable mental state of 
'willfully,' which is the culpable mental state required by 
U.C.A. S 61-1-21, has already been defined under Utah law in 
U.C.A. S 76-2-103(1) to mean 'intentionally.'" Br. of Appellant 
at 64, 67. The instruction makes clear to the jury that it had 
to find defendant willfully (as defined in section 76-2-103(1)) 
made an "untrue statement of a material fact or [willfully] 
omit[ted] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they 
[were] made, not misleading." S 61-1-1(2). 
Finally, defendant's proposed instruction used the 
terms "specific intent" and "general intent" which are no longer 
used in the current criminal code. State v. Calamity. 735 P.2d 
39, 43 (Utah 1987). For this reason alone the court properly 
rejected the proposed instruction and gave one which set forth 
the statutory definition of the applicable culpable mental state. 
See Ibid, (holding that the trial court did not err in refusing 
to give the defendant's requested instruction on "specific 
intent" as an essential element of rape). And, insofar as 
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defendant argues that the trial court was required to instruct 
the jury that in order to convict under section 61-1-1(2), it 
would have to find that defendant willfully made a misstatement 
of a material fact with the intent to defraud, that argument is 
incorrect. Section 61-1-1(2) deals only with a willful 
misstatement or omission of a material fact; it does not contain 
language that would give rise to the additional element of 
"intent to defraud." See, e.g., People v. Mitchell, 175 
Mich.App. 83, 437 N.W.2d 304, 306-08, appeal denied, 433 Mich. 
895 (1990); State v. Tembv, 108 Wis.2d 521, 322 N.W.2d 522, 525-
27 (1982). 
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
not giving defendant's requested instruction and giving 
Instruction No. 17 instead. 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN NOT GIVING DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION THAT DEFINED "MATERIAL FACT" AND 
GIVING AN ALTERNATIVE INSTRUCTION. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing 
to give a correct definition of "material fact." He claims that 
the court did not, as it indicated, give in substance his 
requested instruction on the subject. This assignment of error 
is without merit. 
As noted above, "the framing of instructions lies in 
the trial judge's discretion." Standiford, 769 P.2d at 266. So 
long as they accurately state the law, the instuctions' precise 
wording and specificity is left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court. Alv, 782 P.2d at 550. It is not entirely clear why 
